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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this paper is to see whether the adoption of the Inflation Targeting regime has had an 
impact on the Monetary Transmission Mechanisms in South Africa. I employ a reduced-form 
VAR model to test the strength of the Monetary Transmission Mechanisms during two distinctly 
different monetary policy regimes. I investigate the strength of the various transmission channels 
during the Monetary Targeting regime using data from 1986-1999 and the Inflation Targeting 
regime using data from 2000-2010. The empirical results indicate that the transmission 
mechanisms are stronger during the Inflation Targeting regime.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines the monetary transmission channels in South Africa. I also look at 
whether the adoption of an Inflation Targeting regime has changed the monetary 
transmission mechanisms South Africa. Although a lot of literature on this topic is 
available, very little empirical research has been done on the various transmission 
channels of monetary policy in South Africa. The most popular paper that did extensive 
work on this topic was published in 2001, written by Small and de Jager. At the time the 
inflation targeting regime had only been in place for just over a year. Thus it will be 
interesting to look at whether the transmission mechanisms have changed since then. 
 
Monetary policy works through a complex and elongated series of steps that are described 
by the monetary transmission mechanism. “The monetary transmission mechanism is a 
description of how policy-induced changes in the nominal stock or the short-term nominal 
interest impact on real variables such as aggregate output and employment” (Ireland: 
2005). The sequence of events starts with the initial influence on interest rates, exchange 
rates, equity prices and credit levels. Changes in these variables start to slowly work 
through changes in consumption and investment levels, which influence domestic 
demand. Changes in domestic demand impact aggregate output, wages and the level of 
employment. Ultimately a change in the real variables leads to a change in domestic prices 
i.e. inflation. The monetary transmission mechanism is also concerned about how long it 
takes for monetary policy decisions to have an effect on the real economy, how strong the 
impacts are, and whether the results achieved are the intended results.   
 
The primary policy objective of most monetary policies run by central banks is to achieve 
and maintain domestic prices and financial market stability, however the country defines 
it. To that end, central banks usually chose a nominal anchor for their monetary policy, 
which might be pegging their exchange rate or targeting the growth of a monetary 
aggregate.  There are also purely discretionary monetary policy regimes without any stated 
nominal anchor. Monetary policies frequently have secondary objectives for growth or 
employment, but this is usually not their primary objective.  
Among the various monetary policy regimes being used today, inflation targeting (IT) has 
become increasingly popular, especially amongst advanced economies. In the IT regime, 
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inflation is seen as the nominal anchor and interest rates are the operational policy 
variable. The IT regimes can vary from very strict rules about how the interest rate should 
behave to more discretionary rules. 
 
From the mid-1980s until now, South Africa has experienced two broad monetary 
policies. (Veller & Ellyne: 2011).  From 1986 to 1999, the SARB’s monetary policy 
objective was to target the money supply. During this regime, in the first quarter of each 
year the SARB announced targets for a broad definition of money (M3). The targets were 
put in place with the aim to protect the internal and external value of the Rand. In 
February of 2000 The South African Reserve Bank (SARB) adopted an inflation targeting 
regime, which is still the monetary framework used today. The bank’s objective is to 
protect the value of the currency so that it can help the economy achieve balanced and 
sustainable economic growth over the long run. The SARB’s main objective now is to 
keep the inflation rate in South Africa within a bandwidth of 3% -6%.  In both regimes the 
main policy tool used is the Repurchase (repo) interest rate that the SARB charges to 
commercial banks.   
 
The success of monetary policy depends on its ability to influence real variables. 
However, over time output and prices may become immune to monetary policy shocks.  
When real variables not longer react to monetary policy as expected, it raises questions of 
whether the monetary policy transmission mechanism has changed. There are many 
factors that may alter the effectiveness of monetary transmission mechanisms. “Firms and 
consumers may have changed their behaviour and the organization of markets in a way 
that has reduced the effect of given shocks on output and inflation” (Boivin & Giannoni, 
2002).  Another reason may be that, monetary policy is conducted in a manner that is more 
responsive to fluctuations in output and inflation. This new conduct may reduce the 
impact that monetary shocks may have had on inflation and output (Clarida, Galf and 
Gertler, 2000).  
 
In South Africa the transmission mechanism is affected by many factors. In the early 
1990s the capital market was liberalised and exchange rate controls were dropped.   
More than 50 foreign banks started to operate in South Africa and more people, who 
previously had not banked were absorbed into the market economy.   
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
 5 
The changing world conditions distorted the complex monetary policy transmission 
mechanism and made the SARB’s pursuance of price stability more difficult. (Smal and 
de Jager, 2000).  The relationship between monetary policy variables and the real 
economy variables became obscure.  “ This had the ultimate effect that longer time lags 
had become discernible between the policy change and its desired impact on the real 
economy and inflation” (Smal and de Jager, 2000). 
 
In their paper, Small and De Jager (2001) found that for the South African economy, an 
increase in interest rates will initially lower consumption and investment expenditure and 
therefore output.  They also found that a rising repo rate, changes the interest rate parity 
differential between domestic and foreign interest rates and this serves as a means to 
attract foreign funds. In turn the capital flows cause the exchange rate to appreciate. I find 
similar result in their paper.  My results differ from theirs in that, the VAR that I estimated 
for the period (2000-2010) reflects that the current transmission mechanism that has short 
time lags, whereas they found that there are long time lags between a change in interest 
rates and the impact on the real economy.   
 
2. THE EVOLUTION OF MONETARY POLICY IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
The South African economy has gone through several monetary policy phases that have 
ranged from controlling the money supply to stabilizing interest rates and the exchange 
rate. The De Kock commission clearly outlined the several different monetary policy 
phases of the South African economy since World War II (Mollentze, 2000). In this 
section I summarise the different monetary policy regimes in South Africa from 1965 to 
the present. 
 
The monetary policy phase between 1965 and 1980 represents a period in which non-
market or “direct” monetary controls were used. Fiscal policy was mainly used in the 
pursuance of macroeconomic objectives and monetary policy had a supportive role to 
play.   
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Monetary policy was used as an instrument to implement a counter cyclical monetary 
policy. During this period monetary authorities did not believe in the importance of money 
supply and the efficiency of interest rates.  
 By the late 1960s South Africa was using direct controls such as credit ceilings in efforts 
to reduce the propensity of consumers to spend.  Other monetary controls included; the 
deposit rate, exchange rate, hire purchase and consumer credit controls.  
This policy model started to fail because the need to manage public debt and to finance the 
budget deficit obstructed the objectives of the monetary policy. Market related controls 
were hardly ever used, so policy variables like the interest rate hardly changed. Of course 
the root of the problem was the fact that the South African financial markets were 
underdeveloped. At the same time there were irregular crises in the world’s financial 
markets, which resulted in the realignment of currencies in 1971 and the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system. Post this policy, South Africa tried to implement various interest 
rate linkages. In 1979 monetary authorities introduced a controlled-floating exchange rate 
system. 
 
The next Phase which took place from 1980 to 1985 was a transition from direct controls 
to market related controls.  The 1980’s represented a period of major changes in the 
monetary policy of most countries. The management of demand controls employed in the 
previous phase resulted in more instability in the financial markets and the economy. 
Monetary authorities began to pursue policies that allowed the interest rates to vary with 
the forces of demand and supply. The only problem with the new policy was that the 
objectives of the monetary authorities were not transparent. “They failed to publish the 
details of their intermediate targets pertaining to the growth of the money supply 
(Mollentze, 2000). The reserve bank governor at the time, Dr De Kock meant to apply the 
market orientated policies with a great deal of discretion and flexibility but this came 
under a lot of criticism.  
  In 1986 a Money Supply Targeting regime was introduced.  During this regime monetary 
authorities set targets for the growth of broad money, and these targets were announced in 
the first quarter of each year. The targets were used as guidelines and the SARB could 
breach them without having to explain why (Aron and Muellbauer, 2007). The policy tool 
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employed in this regime was the repo rate, which the SARB used to control overnight 
lending to commercial banks and short-term market interest rates.  
 The objective of the SARB was to protect the internal and external value of the Rand.  
This objective did not imply that the SARB was resolute in its policy objectives. The 
SARB also took into account the fiscal objectives of the government, such as the need to 
stimulate economic growth, to create employment and to improve the living standards of 
South African citizens (Smal et al., 2001).  The commissioner of the SARB at the time, Dr 
Stals expressed that the only way South Africa could achieve its potential economic 
development, is if the financial environment was stable. The De Kock report stated that, 
although increases in demand stimulate growth in the short-run, in the long-run higher 
rates of inflation will impede real output growth. “Balance of payments objectives, growth 
and employment can best be supported by maintaining a climate of reasonable domestic 
price stability” (Smal et al., 2001) 
The liberalization of South Africa’s financial markets resulted in many foreign banks 
coming into South Africa, which significantly increased the amount of funds available to 
issue as credit. Over and above this, more previously unbanked people were being 
absorbed into the economy. Both these factors caused the demand for credit in South 
Africa to be less sensitive to interest rate changes. The large volume of transactions in the 
financial markets made the relationship between the money supply and price changes 
weaker. Therefore the overall interest rate elasticity of expenditure fell quite dramatically. 
“As international capital flows and developments in domestic financial markets began to 
obscure the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, it became apparent that the 
change in the money supply had become a less reliable indicator of underlying inflation, 
and therefore also a less reliable anchor for monetary policy.” (Smal et al., 2001) These 
changes in the monetary transmission mechanism affected the credibility of the money 
supply as a nominal anchor. 
 
At this point, the SARB started to shy away from targeting the money supply to 
employing a range of economic indicators to determine their policy action. In 1998 Dr. 
Stals suggested that South Africa should gradually move towards a monetary policy of 
Inflation Targeting. At this time many countries, with New Zealand being the first had 
shifted their monetary policy frameworks towards targeting the inflation, the ultimate goal 
obviously being to keep inflation as low as possible.  
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On the 23
rd
 of February 2000, the minister of finance announced that the South African 
government had decided to implement Inflation Targeting as the new monetary policy 
framework.  The decision was to set a target range of between three and six percent in the 
year 2002. The policy main objective of the SARB did not change. The SARB aimed to 
protect the value of the currency so that it could continue to pursue economic growth that 
is balanced and sustainable. 
The SARB achieves financial stability by influencing the money supply and bank credit 
extension. They can do this in two ways; either by influencing the supply of money or the 
demand for credit from the private sector. The money supply can be influenced with 
operational instruments such as the minimum cash reserves for banking institutions, open-
market operations and short-term money market interventions through swaps and 
repurchase transactions. (Mboweni, 2000). The demand for credit is managed by 
influencing the level of interest rates. In this case, the repo is used as the operational 
instrument. The Inflation Targeting regime has made the monetary policy in South Africa 
more transparent. There are many communication channels between the SARB and the 
greater public.  
Another approach developed by the National Treasury, to be implemented by the SARB, 
is to adopt the new Macroprudential approach.  This approach arose due to a need to 
manage system-wide risk across the entire financial sector as a response to the aftermath 
of the financial crisis. The Macroprudential approach entails the analysis of 
macroeconomic trends and how they interact with the potential soundness and stability of 
financial firms and the financial system. (National Treasury Policy Document, 2011) 
On the downside, Inflation Targeting has received a lot of criticism. Labour organisations 
such as the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) argue that inflation 
targeting leads to an overemphasis on monetary stability at the cost of growth and 
development, and it reduces flexibility in dealing with exogenous shocks to the economy. 
This however is not entirely true.  The concentration on achieving the inflation target does 
not imply that the SARB is not concerned with economic growth and employment. “A 
careful analysis is made of current and projected international and domestic economic 
conditions in the determination of the monetary policy stance.” (Van der Merwe, 2004)  
However, the primary objective of the SARB is to influence interest rates so that thy can 
combat inflation. 
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3. CHANNELS OF MONETARY TRANSMISSION 
Following (Smal et al., 2001), I briefly describe some of the monetary transmission 
channels using the categories provided by Mishkin (1995).  The broad categories are; the 
traditional interest rate channel, other asset price channels and the credit channels.  
The description of the monetary transmission channels that follows here assumes that the 
central bank pursues an expansionary monetary policy by resetting the policy instrument. 
 
2.1 The Interest Rate Channel 
Short-term interest rates: A change in the repo rate is immediately transmitted to other 
short-term wholesale money-market rates and other short-term rates such as interbank 
deposits. Soon after a change in the repo rate, banks normally also adjust their lending 
rates by the same amount at the change in the repo rate.  This immediately changes the 
rates at which banks lend their customers for variable-rate loans. Long-term interest rates:  
The effect of a change in the repo rate may have an ambiguous effect on long-term interest 
rates. The reason is that long-term rates are influenced by an average of current and 
expected future short-term rates. Therefore, the outcome of long-term interest rates 
depends on the direction and the magnitude of the repo rate change on the expectations of 
the future path of interest rates.  The actual effect of the repo rate on long-term rates will 
partially depend on how the policy change will impact inflation expectations.  
An expansionary monetary policy reduces the cost of capital. This causes both investment 
and consumption spending to rise.  Increase in expenditure leads to an increase in 
aggregate demand and therefore an increases domestic prices and output.  This channel 
therefore operates through businesses’ and consumers’ decisions because both groups 
spent on investment. Businesses invest in capital while consumers invest in housing and 
durable goods. According to (Mishkin: 1996), what is important about the interest rate 
channel is that it is the real rather than the nominal rates, and the long-term rather than the 
short-term rates that ultimately have an impact on the investment behavior of businesses 
and consumers.  
The connection between the short nominal rates and the real long term rates that influence 
expenditure is best explained by (Mishkin: 1996). “The key is sticky prices, so that 
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expansionary monetary policy which lowers the short term nominal interest also lowers 
the short-term real interest rate, and this would be true even in a world with rational 
expectations” (Mishkin: 1996). The expectations hypothesis of the term structure of 
interest rates, states that, the long interest rate is an average of future short interest rates, 
which explains how short rates ultimately influence factors that are only influenced by 
long term rates. 
 
2.2 The Other Assets Price Channels 
This channel explains how relative asset prices and wealth effects transmit monetary 
effects into the real economy. The two key assets that are extensively investigated are the 
foreign exchange and the equities. 
3.2.1 The Exchange Rate Channel  
This channel operates through monetary deposits and net exports. Monetary Deposits: 
when an expansionary monetary policy is implemented, deposits denominated in local-
currency offer lower returns hence they become less attractive than their foreign 
denominated counterparts. As a result investors disinvest in local-currency denominated 
deposits, which cause the exchange rate to depreciate. Net Exports: a depreciated currency 
makes imports relatively expensive and makes exports relatively cheap, which increases 
net exports. An increase in net exports increases total output. A weaker exchange rate also 
makes foreign goods relatively more expensive, which means that inflation is imported 
through the purchase of these goods.  
3.2.2 The Equity Price Channels 
According to Mishkin (1996) there are two channels of the equity price mechanism that 
are important. The Tobin’s Q theory of investment and the wealth effects on consumption. 
There is also a third channel called the Housing and Land Price Channels (See Mishkin, 
1996). In this paper I only explain the wealth effects channel.  
This channel operates through equity prices which occur through wealth effects on 
consumption. “A major component of wealth is common stocks” (Mishkin: 1996). When 
the monetary policy is relaxed, economic agents find that they have more money at their 
disposal.  
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They may invest their in the stock market, which increases the demand for stocks and 
hence stock prices.  When the values of stocks go up, it increases the lifetime resources of 
consumers and therefore a rise in consumption. Ultimately an increase in consumption 
will increase output and prices. 
 
2.3 The Credit Channel 
The credit channel can be split into two channels, namely the bank lending channel and 
the balance sheet of households and firms channel.  
3.3.1 The Bank Lending Channel 
When the monetary authorities decide to embark on an expansionary monetary policy, 
they increase the bank’s reserves and deposits which in turn increase the amount of credit 
the banks can issue.  
More credit in the hands of businesses and households will increase investment and 
consumption expenditure. In turn the Increase in expenditure will result in an increase in 
output.  
According to (Mishkin: 1995) this channel is more important for small enterprises which 
depend on bank credit more that bigger corporations since they can raise funds in the 
capital and bond markets. Mishkin also mentions that on a global scale, banks are starting 
to play less of a role as lenders, which renders them small players in the credit markets and 
therefore making the bank lending channel a week one.  
3.3.2 The Balance Sheet Channels 
This channel can be broken further into smaller channels which are not discussed in this 
paper (See Mishkin 1996) 
This channel is a combination of the household and the businesses balance sheet channel. 
This channel occurs due to asymmetric information in the credit markets, namely the 
adverse selection and moral hazard problem. The higher the net worth of households and 
businesses the less the severity of the adverse selection and moral hazard problem are in 
lending to these agents. Higher net worth means that borrowers have more collateral to 
secure their loans, therefore losses due to adverse selection that could accrue to banks are 
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lower. A decline in the adverse selection problem means that the overall lending to 
businesses and households will rise which increases investment spending and hence 
output. A decrease in the interest rate will increase the households and businesses cash 
flows or collateral, which reduces the adverse selection and the moral hazard problem. 
This will result in more credit extended, which in urn will increase investment expenditure 
and finally cause a rise in output.  
 According to Mishkin, an important feature of this particular channel is, unlike the 
interest channel, it is actually the nominal interest rates that have an impact of cash flows 
“Furthermore, the short-term interest rate plays a special role on this transmission 
mechanism because it is interest payment in the short-term rather than long term debt that 
typically have the greatest impact on cash flow” (Mishkin: 1996) 
 
2.4  Second Round Effects 
Over and above the direct monetary transmission channels, there may be further effects on 
economic agents which were not directly affected by monetary policy change.  For 
example other firms and individuals may be affected by changes in consumer spending or 
increased demand from other firms.  These indirect effects can be anticipated by other 
agents in the economy, which means that there may be a large impact on expectations and 
confidence. For example upturns and downturn in the business cycle tend to reinforce the 
confidence and the cautious attitudes to spending by consumers and firms. “This means 
that the individuals and firms most directly affected by changes in the repo rate are not 
necessarily those most affected by its full repercussions” (The transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy, 1999) 
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4. FACTORS THAT AFFECT THE MONETARY 
POLICY TRANSMISSION MECHANISM IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
South Africa is quite different from other economies in that it has quite a complex socio-
political and economic history. As a result, there are many factors that affect the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism. These factors include socio-political goals, interest rate 
elasticity, expectations, changes in capital markets and time lags (Mollentze, 2000) 
South Africa has changed quite significantly since the 1980s.  It is now integrated into the 
world global markets, which it was excluded from prior to the mid-1980s. The fact that the 
economy is now operating in a totally different environment that it used to, means that the 
impact of monetary policy has also changed. The new government which came in place in 
1994 still has many socio-political and economic goals that it would like to achieve. The 
government has to address socio-economic problems such as poverty, unemployment and 
try to achieve economic growth. Therefore, in South Africa there is increased pressure for 
monetary policy to address such problems.  This is problematic because it is difficult for 
the SARB to achieve its mandate of achieving price stability while addressing these socio-
economic problems as well.  These socio-economic problems are one of the factors that 
impede on the efficiency of the monetary transmission mechanism in South Africa.  
The liberalization of South Africa’s financial markets caused the overall interest rate 
elasticity of expenditure to fall quite dramatically. Changes in interest rate elasticities have 
a large impact of the efficiency of the monetary transmission mechanism.  
Expectations also play a role in how monetary decisions are transmitted into the real 
economy. South Africa’s labour market is very rigid with regard to changes in wages.  
Prices in the economy, including wages can move up but they never move down.  
This is an example of the rational expectations theory. The extent of price rigidities 
influences the transmission mechanism. Inflation expectations are another factor. If these 
cannot be anchored by the SARB, they may result in a case where efforts to curb inflation 
become unsuccessful. “All this ultimately affects simple market-related determination of 
variables and makes the transmission of monetary policy less effective.” (Mollentze, 
2000) 
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The integration of South Africa into global financial markets implies that events that occur 
outside of South Africa have an effect on domestic markets.  This can be illustrated by 
how rapidly the Johannesburg Stock Exchange reacts to events that occur in other 
countries. Today there are many financial markets operating in different economies and 
one can find many types of financial instruments, these factors also affect the efficiency of 
monetary policy. 
South Africa is a middle income economy that has a sophisticated financial market and 
banking sector. In other economies, this attribute serves to speed up the reaction of 
intermediate and real variables to changes in the monetary policy. But South Africa is also 
a developing economy and it has many structural problems that industrialised economies 
do not have. This causes the monetary transmission to be less effective and to take time 
lags which would not occur otherwise. 
Another factor that affects the transmission mechanisms in South Africa, is the emerging 
markets contagion effects. According to Pritsker, Contagion can be defined as an 
occurrence when a shock to one or a group of markets, countries, or institutions, spread to 
other markets, or countries or institutions. “Stock markets through out the world, and 
especially those in emerging markets, seem to be excessively correlated.” (Rigobon, 2002) 
Contagion can occur via real sector linkages, financial sector linkages, financial institution 
linkages and interactions of financial institutions and financial markets.  
5. METHODOLOGY 
I employ a reduced-form VAR model to asses the strength of the monetary transmission 
mechanism in South Africa.  A VAR model is a reduced form dynamic system of 
equations, which describe the evolution of a set of endogenous variables over the same 
sample period as a linear function of their past evolution. VARs are important for this type 
of empirical work because the normal structural economic modeling approach in not very 
helpful, in that, the theoretical restrictions limit the interdependencies of the variables 
included in the model. According to (Poddar. et al: 2006) the VAR methodology allows 
researchers to use minimal restrictions on how monetary shocks affect the economy which 
works as a distinct advantage because the working of the monetary transmission 
mechanism lacks analytical work.  
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“In addition, this approach recognises explicitly the simultaneity between monetary policy 
and macroeconomic developments, that is, the interdependence on monetary policy on 
other economic variables (the policy reaction function), as well as the dependence of 
economic variables on monetary policy (Poddar. et al: 2006).  
 
A good motivation for choosing to employ a VAR model is because most of the empirical 
literature that investigates the monetary policy transmission mechanism in different 
countries utilises the VAR approach. In most papers, the VAR focuses on reduced-form 
relationships between monetary policy and real economy variables using a small number 
of variables. Once estimated, VARs can be used to simulate what is known as impulse 
response functions of any of the variables used in the model to see how a once off shock to 
that variable would influence itself and other variables over time.  
The mathematical representation of the reduced form VAR is: 
yt = c + A1yt-1 + A2yt-2 + ... + Apyt-p + et 
Where yt is a vector of k endogenous variables, c is a k×1 vector of constraints (intercept), 
A1…Ap are matrices of coefficients to be estimated, and et is a vector of innovation that 
may be contemporaneously correlated but are uncorrelated with their own lagged values 
and uncorrelated with all the of the right-hand side variables. In other words, the error 
variables in the vector et have zero means, constant variances, and are individually serially 
uncorrelated. 
The structure of the system does not incorporate contemporaneous feedback because only 
the lagged variables of the endogenous variables enter on the right-hand side of the 
equations. As a result, there will not be any problems of simultaneity. This implies that the 
ordinary Least Squares (OLS) yields consistent estimates. 
SPECIFICATION AND PRE TESTING OF THE MODEL 
I estimate the VAR model using quarterly data from 1986 Q1 to 2010 Q2.  Firstly I 
investigate how strong the monetary transmission channels are in South Africa’s current 
monetary policy regime i.e. the Inflation Targeting regime. Secondly I estimate two 
VARS over two distinct periods. The first period is the monetary targeting policy regime 
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which spanned from 1986 to 1999. The second period is the inflation targeting regime 
which started in 2000 to the present. 
The optimal lag length for the VARs estimated in both the periods was two, using the 
Akaike and the Schwartz criterion.  The variables in the model are non-stationary, 
however following Sims (1980) and Sims, Stock, and Watson (1990), the variables in the 
VAR system should not be differenced even if they contain a unit root.  
Their argument is that the goal of a VAR analysis is to determine the interrelationships 
among the variables, not to determine the parameter estimates. Differencing or de-trending 
the data throws away the co-movements in the data (such as the possibility of co-
integrating relationships). The view is that the variables in a VAR system should mimic 
the true data generating process. The implication of estimating the model in levels is that 
there will be some efficiency losses, but according to Poddar. et al (2006) this does not 
change the consistency of the estimators. “Most of the empirical literature on VARs has 
tended to estimate VARs that are unrestricted in levels.  
 
6. VAR RESULTS 
In first section of the results I assess the importance and strength of the monetary 
transmission variables for each channel. In the second part I assess if the monetary 
transmission mechanism has changed since inflation Targeting was adopted 
TESTING THE DIFFERENT CHANNELS 
The aim of this section is to test the strength of the monetary transmission variables during 
the Inflation Targeting period (2000-2010). The key question is to see whether the 
monetary transmission channels are operating as we would expect. In all VARS, the order 
of the variables remains constant and the impulse response functions are generated by a 
one standard deviation shock to the impulse variable in each channel.  
The graphs in this section represent period-to-period impulse response functions. The 
horizontal axis shows the number of quarters that passed after the impulse variable is 
shocked. The vertical axis measures the response of the relevant variable, where a value of 
0.001 corresponds to a 0.1% of the baseline value of the response variable.  
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The gradient of the CPI curve is interpreted as the inflation and the gradient of the GDP 
curve is interpreted as the Growth in GDP. 
 
The Interest Rate Channel  
We expect that a tighter monetary policy, which is represented by the positive shock to the 
repo, would lead to a fall in output and prices. In figure 1, we see that higher interest rates 
temporarily increase prices by raising the cost of financing. LCPI falls by almost 0.08% of 
its base value while LGDP falls by 0.04% of its base value. Therefore, the impact of a 
repo shock on inflation is substantially larger than on output growth.  
Although a tighter monetary policy reduces both output and prices, output starts to return 
to its equilibrium level after just 5 quarters whereas prices take about 17 quarters.    
A fall in interest rates also tends to appreciate the exchange rate, i.e. an increase in the 
(LREER), reduce the credit level (LCREDIT), and depress asset prices (LALSI), all 
respond as expected. The temporary rise in credit probably reflects duress in the business 
sector.  
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Figure 1 REPO 
shock
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The Asset Price Channel 
Figure 2 shows the impulse response functions to a one standard deviation shock to the All 
Share Index (LALSI), which serves as a proxy for all wealth assets. A positive shock to 
financial assets raises consumer prices for about 12 quarters before the prices revert back 
to the equilibrium level. The slope is increasing at a decreasing rate, meaning that a stock 
market shock has a proportionately smaller impact on inflation.  
Output responds very positively to a shock in asset prices, but the impact is very short-
lived, increasing for the first year and then gradually reverting back to equilibrium. I had 
expected a more prolonged positive impact, but this shock appears to set off a 
destabilizing boom bust cycle. 
 
It is not surprising to see reserve money increase in response to a positive shock to the 
stock market, which may come from a domestic wealth effect, leading to a greater demand 
for money. The real effective exchange rate initially depreciates (declines), perhaps in 
response to an expected rise in inflation or a dip in the interest rate, but then it starts to 
appreciate ultimately leaving a stronger Rand, which is probably due to the long-run 
decline in CPI. 
The asset price channel operates according to our a-priori expectations in the short-run but 
appears to create a strong medium and long-run correction, which strikes as destabilizing 
in the medium term.  The other housing price index was also tested but it did not perform 
as well for a measure of asset wealth.  
 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
 20 
Figure 2 Equity Price 
Shock
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The Credit Channel 
We expect a positive shock to credit to raise both output and prices.  This seems to be the 
case, but the impact is very short-lived (about 3 quarters).  Thus a one time surge in credit 
looks like it creates an undesirable output cycle.  For prices we see that it raises inflation at 
first and takes almost 8 quarters before a correction begins.  It is uncharacteristic to see an 
increase in inflation that goes hand-in-hand with a fall in GDP. The credit surge leads to a 
depreciation of the exchange rate, probably in anticipation of a higher price level. The 
delayed increase in money supply may reflect the continued fall in output for 10 quarters. 
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Figure 3 Credit Shock 
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The Exchange Rate Channel 
The impulse response functions to a positive shock (appreciation) to the real effective 
exchange rate are shown in figure 4.  The strong exchange rate has the expected effect of 
reducing the price level and raising the value of asset prices, but has an unexpected effect 
of raising output. One explanation may be that a real appreciation reduces the current 
account balance. That is, while input prices get cheaper and real export prices raise, the 
corresponding quantities of imports and exports are not changing very much. A stronger 
exchange rate may be increasing output through the relatively lower price of inputs when 
the Rand appreciates. 
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Figure 4 Exchange Rate 
Shock
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TESTING THE CHANGE IN THE MONETARY TRANSMISSION 
MECHANISMOVERTHE TWO REGIMES  
The aim of this section is to empirically test if the monetary transmission mechanism has 
changed since the SARB adopted an Inflation Targeting regime. 
I re-estimate the previous VAR model for the (1986-1999) period and examine if the 
impulse-responses differ from those of the VAR estimated for the (2000-2010) period.  
The criterion for the comparison is made up of three factors: I compare (i) the direction of 
the response curves, (ii) the magnitude of the reactions and (iii) the lags involved.  
 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
 23 
Table 1 summarizes the response of CPI and GDP to shock in the repo rate, all share 
index, credit to the private sector and the real effective exchange rate, for each regime. To 
simplify the interpretation, I will refer to the Monetary Targeting Regime as the MT 
regime and the Inflation Targeting Regime as the IT Regime.  
Results of comparison: 
Repo rate shock:  
Inflation: in the MT regime setting, a tighter monetary policy causes a positive shock to 
prices. For the first 8 quarters prices increase at a fast rate, and then start to increase at a 
slower rate as CPI returns back to its equilibrium level. This is not surprising because of 
the rational expectations theory which applies to South Africa. Prices generally increase 
but they never come down. The inflation rate seems to increase throughout the response 
period. This implies that during the MT regime, inflation was immune to a change in 
interest rates.  
In the IT regime setting, inflation stays positive for the first nine quarters. The initial 
response of prices to an increase in the interest rate is to increase, due to the increase in the 
credit bill. After about two years, people and businesses start to realize that they have less 
monetary resources, and therefore expenditure goes down. Prices start to fall at an 
increasing rate, reflecting a decrease in the inflation rate. Therefore inflation seems to 
react more appropriately in the IT regime. 
GDP growth: In both regimes, a decline in the repo rate causes GDP to fall. GDP falls 
immediately in the MT regime setting and it falls to almost 0.06% of its base value. It 
takes roughly two quarters before starting to fall in the IT regime setting and it falls to less 
than 0.05% of its base value. In terms of the GDP response, the difference between the 
two regimes is very small.  
 
Equity price shock: 
Inflation: in both the regimes, a shock to the all share index causes prices to increase and 
they continue to do so for the entire observation period. Therefore, an increase in equity 
prices cause inflation as expected, and the magnitude of the CPI reaction function is 
slightly higher in the IT regime. 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
ap
e 
To
w
n
 24 
GDP growth: in the MT regime, an increase in the all share index causes the GDP to fall, 
which is a fall in the growth rate of GDP. This goes against our expectations. The fall in 
GDP is also contradictory to the fact that domestic prices increased.  In the IT regime, 
GDP growth is positive and it lasts for about 10 quarters reflecting the increase in the 
wealth of individuals as stock market prices increase. The equity price channel therefore 
seems to work better in the IT regime setting as compared to the MT regime setting. 
 
Credit Shock:. 
Inflation: In both regimes, a shock to the credit level causes inflation to increase rapidly 
for the first 4 quarters, with equal magnitude. After one year, the inflation continues to 
increase but more gradually. The inflation rate only starts to fall after about 13 quarters.   
GDP growth: in both regimes, the GDP grows for about a year and then starts to fall. In 
both cases the magnitude is quite small and does not really convince me that GDP reacted 
as we would expect. The rapid fall in GDP after just one year, may be reflecting a 
response by the monetary authorities. The SARB tries to control inflation by curbing the 
amount of credit offered to the private sector. Therefore an increase in the credit level may 
cause the SARB to increase interest rates. The fall in GDP may therefore be reflecting not 
only a possible response by the SARB, but also an indication that an interest rate shock 
has a much larger impact on GDP than a credit shock. 
 
Exchange rate shock:  a positive exchange rate shock should reduce net exports and 
therefore reduce output and prices. 
Inflation: In the IT regime, a positive shock to the REER causes the inflation rate to 
increase. This result is very peculiar. A plausible explanation could be that during the MT 
regime, the exchange rate was controlled. Given that the nominal exchange rate didn’t 
move with market forces, it is not surprising to find that prices did not react to a shock in 
the exchange rate. In the IT regime inflation reacts appropriately. IT falls by 0.8% of its 
base value and it keeps falling for over two years (9 quarters). 
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GDP growth: A shock to the exchange rate causes the GDP level to fall and only start 
returning to the equilibrium level after 7 quarters. Therefore during the MT regime, a 
stronger exchange rate reduced output via a decline in net exports.  
In the IT regime a shock to the exchange causes GDP to increase. As mentioned in part 
one of the results, it is possible that lower production input costs may be overriding the 
negative impact of a decline in net exports, hence causing an increase in GDP. 
 
7. SUMMARY 
The overall results seem to indicate the monetary transmission mechanism channels are 
stronger and more effective in the IT regime. The interest rate channel is stronger in the IT 
regime, based on the reaction of both output and prices. A shock to the ALSI increases 
both prices and output in the IT regime, but increases only prices in the MT regime. In 
both the regimes, the Credit channel impacts prices and output in the same way. It is 
therefore difficult to see in which regime the credit channel is stronger. The shock in the 
exchange rate is also inconclusive.  
The exchange rate channel gave very mixed results in both regimes that make their 
comparison futile.  It is worth considering that exchange rate effects are different for 
emerging market economies like South Africa. Particularly portfolio flows are not driven 
only by interest rate differentials. Other factors include growth expectations, exchange rate 
expectations, relative interest rate differentials, global risk appetite (so-called safe-haven 
effects). These various factors that affect the exchange rate work in different directions 
and complicate the exchange rate channel. Therefore linkages between the policy rate and 
the exchange rate changes in a system of large portfolio flows are unpredictable. 
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Table 1: Comparisons of channels during the different monetary policy regimes 
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8. CONCLUSION 
In this paper I attempted to understand the monetary transmission mechanisms in 
South Africa. In the Inflation Targeting regime, the interest rate channel seems to 
be quite strong based on the magnitude of the reaction function and the relatively 
short time lags. These findings are positive in light of the fact that, the SARB’s 
monetary policy objective is to target inflation without impeding economic 
growth too much. The intermediate variables; the ALSI, Credit level and the 
REER respond with a large negative response to a tighter monetary policy shock 
which is as expected. Their response time lag is also relatively short and it takes 
them from about 5 to 9 quarters before they start to revert back to their 
equilibrium levels. Reserve money falls in response to the tighter monetary 
policy, and then starts to return back to its equilibrium level after 6 quarters.  
When comparing the two monetary policy regimes, transmission mechanisms are 
stronger in the Inflation Targeting regime. Output and inflation react as we would 
expect, to a shock in the interest rate, all share index and the credit level. The 
exchange rate channel gave mixed results. During some parts of the MT regime 
the exchange rate was controlled which may have obscured the relationship 
between the real effective exchange rate and prices. In the IT regime, a shock to 
the exchange rate has a positive impact to output, which may signal that it is 
working though other mechanism that overrides the net exports mechanism. 
A caveat to my results, the time period of the data when separated into the two 
regimes becomes quite short. This might preclude any strong statements about 
long-run relationships between the variables.  
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